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INTRODUCTION
On May 2, 2006, Joseph Lewis Clark was executed by lethal
injection in Ohio for the 1984 murder of David Manning, a twenty1
three-year-old gas station attendant. After prison personnel spent
twenty-five minutes searching for a suitable vein, an “agitated” Clark
2
raised his head and declared, “It don’t work,” five times. During a
second attempt, which spanned thirty minutes, witnesses reported
3
hearing Clark moan and cry out. At one point, Clark requested that
4
prison officials give him “something by mouth to end this.” Finally,
nearly ninety minutes after the procedure was initiated, Clark was
5
pronounced dead.
An autopsy report later revealed alarming
evidence that Clark had been punctured with the needle nineteen
6
times and had not been properly injected with the lethal drugs.
The botched execution of Joseph Lewis Clark illustrates the
modern legal controversy surrounding the administration of lethal
7
injection in the United States. In recent years there has been a
1. John Provance & Christina Hall, Clark Execution Raises Lethal-Injection Issues,
BLADE, May 4, 2006, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Adam Liptak, Trouble Finding Inmate’s Vein Slows Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 2006, at A16; see also MICHAEL L. RADELET, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SOME
EXAMPLES OF POST-FURMAN BOTCHED EXECUTIONS (2008), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions
(providing examples of botched executions, including Joseph Clark’s).
4. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, IV Fiasco Led Killer To Ask for Plan B, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, May 12, 2006, at E1.
5. RADELET, supra note 3 (“[W]itnesses later reported that they heard ‘moaning,
crying out and guttural noises.’”) (citing Alan Johnson, ‘It Don’t Work,’ Inmate Says
During Botched Execution, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 3, 2006, at 1A).
6. See Seema Shah, How Lethal Injection Reform Constitutes Impermissible Research on
Prisoners, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2008) (“Misplacing the drugs in this
manner would minimize the effectiveness of the anesthesia and make it much more
likely that Mr. Clark was aware of the severe pain associated with awareness of the
heart-stopping action of the final drug in the sequence.”); see also Jim Provance,
Victim’s Relative Sides with Killer’s Kin, BLADE, May 30, 2007, at A3 (discussing how
Clark’s execution was so disturbing that Manning’s brother, a witness to the
execution, publicly denounced the procedure as excessively cruel).
7. Clark’s botched execution was one of at least twenty-nine botched lethal
injection executions over the past three decades. See RADELET, supra note 3
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significant increase in litigation challenging the constitutionality of
lethal injection, as new evidence has ignited concerns that the
process by which it is administered may subject inmates to an
8
excruciating death. This controversy culminated in the United
9
States Supreme Court’s April 16, 2008, decision in Baze v. Rees. In
Baze, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Kentucky’s
three-drug lethal injection protocol, which two death row inmates
argued created an “‘unnecessary risk’ of pain,” in violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
10
punishment.
In fact, the Supreme Court has never held an
11
execution method unconstitutional. Baze marked only the second
12
time in history that the Supreme Court considered such a challenge;
the first was in 1878, when it upheld the constitutionality of the firing
13
squad.
The Supreme Court decided Baze the same day it heard oral
14
arguments in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a case challenging the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute authorizing the death penalty
15
The petitioner, Patrick Kennedy, was
for the rape of a child.
convicted of the aggravated rape of his eight-year-old stepdaughter in
a crime so brutal that the Court found it impossible to describe “in a
way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted on his
victim or . . . the revulsion society, and the jury that represents it,
16
sought to express by sentencing [Kennedy] to death.” The Supreme
Court struck down Louisiana’s statute as unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment, reasoning that a national consensus and the
Court’s own informed judgment reflected a determination that death
(cataloging, in a non-exhaustive list, the forty-one best known botched executions
since 1982, including many in which lethal injection was the method of execution).
8. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007); Cooper v.
Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004); Cooey v. Taft, No. 2:04-cv-1156, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 65480 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2007); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972
(N.D. Cal. 2006); Walker v. Johnson, 448 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Va. 2006); Evans v.
Saar, 412 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D. Md. 2006); Brown v. Beck, No. 5:06CT3018, 2006 WL
3914717 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 7, 2006); State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411 (Del. 1994); Bieghler
v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 2005); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d
292 (Tenn. 2005).
9. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
10. Id. at 1529.
11. Id. at 1530.
12. See John Gibeaut, Tinkering with Lethal Injection: An Eighth Amendment
Challenge Comes Before the High Court, 94 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2008) (discussing the buzz
among members of the capital litigation bar when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Baze).
13. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
14. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
15. Id. at 2646.
16. Id.
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was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of rape where the
17
victim did not die.
Kennedy continues a series of cases decided over the past several
decades through which the Supreme Court has gradually narrowed
the types of crimes and classes of offenders a state may punish by
18
death. In recognition of the “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society,” a standard first articulated
19
in Trop v. Dulles, the Court has held death to be a disproportionate
20
21
penalty for the crimes of rape of an adult woman, felony murder,
22
and murder committed by a juvenile or mentally retarded
23
This Comment will argue that, while the Court’s
defendants.
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has gradually reduced the
circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed, this
trend is inconsistent with the Court’s unwillingness to critically
examine the specific procedures states use to execute, even in the
face of growing concerns over the humaneness of such procedures.
Part I of this Comment gives a historic overview of the Court’s
limited method-of-execution jurisprudence, followed by a review of
the Court’s recent line of rulings on challenges to the death penalty’s
proportionality. This Comment then examines the evolution of
execution methods leading to the near universal use of lethal
17. Id. at 2649–64 (explaining that a “proportionality” analysis under the Eighth
Amendment includes considering whether a particular punishment is “graduated
and proportionate to [the] offense” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
367 (1910)) (alterations in original). Louisiana petitioned the Supreme Court for a
rehearing in September 2008, arguing that a military law authorizing the death
penalty for the rape of a child had been overlooked by both parties and the Court.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008). The State claimed this oversight
undermined the Court’s conclusion that there was no national consensus favoring
capital punishment for child rape. Id. at 3. The Court denied the petition for
rehearing on October 1, 2008. Id. at 2 (“[A]uthorization of the death penalty in the
military sphere does not indicate that the penalty is constitutional in the civilian
context.”).
18. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2654 (citing the Court’s earlier determination in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976), that death, because of its “severity and
irrevocability,” must be limited to the most grievous crimes). But see FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 184 (2003)
(suggesting that the Court’s recent willingness to limit the imposition of the death
penalty may be attributable to a reaction by the Court’s moderate Justices against its
conservative stance on the death penalty as compared to the legal community as a
whole, and citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), as “the most prominent
example of this trend”).
19. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Trop, the Court held that denationalization for the
crime of desertion offended the “principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the
Eighth Amendment” and was thus unconstitutional. Id. at 99–101.
20. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
21. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
23. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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injection in the United States. Finally, Part I discusses Baze’s
significance in light of the lack of a uniform constitutional standard
24
for reviewing method-of-execution challenges, and then evaluates
the Court’s splintered ruling.
Part II analyzes Baze within the broader context of the Court’s
Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence. Specifically, it
argues that the Court’s gradual restriction of the administration of
the death penalty with respect to certain classes of offenders and
categories of crimes is inconsistent with its near indifference to the
specific procedures states use to execute. Part III discusses the
implications of the Baze decision and concludes with
recommendations for states going forward with lethal injection and
courts reviewing method-of-execution challenges.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. A Historic Overview of Method-of-Execution Challenges
In drafting the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits the infliction
25
of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Framers of the
Constitution “were primarily concerned . . . with proscribing
26
‘tortures’ and other ‘barbarous’ methods of punishment.” At the
27
time, capital punishment was authorized in every state.
24. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REV. 319, 333–48 (1997) [hereinafter Denno, Executions] (discussing the
“scant guidance” the Court has offered for reviewing method-of-execution challenges
and how the Court often dismisses such cases on procedural grounds); Deborah W.
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of
Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 67, 69–
77 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Legislatures] (“The United States Supreme Court[]
[has shown a] complete constitutional disregard for how inmates are executed,
irrespective of a century-long pattern of horrifying, and entirely preventable, mishaps
linked to all execution methods.”).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
26. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169–71 (1976) (describing the history of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and its application in early Supreme Court
cases that focused on the constitutionality of specific execution methods); see also
Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 852–65 (1969) (discussing the adoption of the “cruel
and unusual punishments” clause by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689); Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney:
Analyzing the (Un)constitutionality of the Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153,
155–56 (1996) (“The English adopted this prohibition [on cruel and unusual
punishments] in response to the Stuart regime’s frequent use of torture and other
barbaric measures against English subjects. These concerns followed the colonists
across the Atlantic to the New World.”) (citation omitted).
27. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176–77 (asserting that capital punishment was
considered an acceptable form of punishment by the Framers of the Constitution
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Prior to its decision in Baze, the last time the Supreme Court
squarely considered the constitutionality of a specific execution
28
method was in Wilkerson v. Utah. Wilkerson was convicted of first
degree murder in the Utah territory and challenged his sentence of
29
death by public shooting.
Noting the difficulty of defining the
precise parameters of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and
unusual punishments,” the Supreme Court held that death by firing
30
squad was not constitutionally proscribed. According to the Court,
drawing and quartering, public dissecting, burning alive and
disemboweling, and other circumstances where “terror, pain or
disgrace were . . . superadded,” would constitute cruel and unusual
31
punishment. However, the Court reasoned that death by firing
squad did not fall within this category because it was the common
32
method used to punish military offenses at the time, and concluded
33
that Wilkerson’s sentence was constitutional.
Since its ruling in Wilkerson, the Supreme Court has only addressed
the constitutionality of execution methods indirectly. In In re
34
Kemmler, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to
New York’s electrocution statute, concluding that the Eighth
35
Amendment was not incorporated against the states, and deferred

and that its existence was contemplated by the Fifth Amendment, and subsequently,
the Fourteenth).
28. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
29. Id. at 130–31.
30. Id. at 134–36.
31. Id. at 135.
32. See id. at 135 (“Soldiers convicted of desertion or other capital military
offenses are in the great majority of cases sentenced to be shot, and the ceremony for
such occasions is given in great fulness by the writers upon the subject of courtsmartial.”).
33. Id. at 136. Incidentally, as Wilkerson’s sentence was carried out, he moved
just enough for the bullets to miss his heart. He bled to death for twenty-seven
minutes in front of a stunned crowd. See Gilbert King, Op-Ed, Cruel and Unusual
History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A21 (criticizing the Baze decision and the
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence generally for ignoring a history of
botched executions).
34. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). William Kemmler was the first prisoner sentenced to
death by electrocution. See Harding, supra note 26, at 158–60 (discussing how the
Kemmler decision demonstrated the limitations of the historical interpretation test of
evaluating execution methods in the face of advancing technology).
35. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447–49. This proposition was later overturned by the
Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson held that a California
law criminalizing narcotics addiction, even where the defendant was not engaged in
illegal conduct at the time of his arrest and where there was no evidence he had ever
used a narcotic in the state, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 666.

2009]

CONTEMPLATING “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL”

639
36

to the legislature’s finding that electrocution was humane. Though
holding on incorporation grounds, the Court stated that under the
Eighth Amendment “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death[,]” and “[‘cruel’] implies . . . something
inhuman and barbarous,—something more than the mere
37
extinguishment of life.” Following Kemmler, states proceeded with
executions by electrocution, many of which were “grotesque failures,
38
including William Kemmler’s.”
39
Fifty-seven years later, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, the
Supreme Court held that it would not be “cruel and unusual” to
execute “Lucky” Willie Francis, whose first execution by electrocution
40
was botched due to a mechanical malfunction. The Court reasoned
that an “unforeseeable accident” did not amount to “the wanton
41
infliction of pain” barred by the Eighth Amendment. Francis was
42
executed by electrocution four months later.
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the death
43
penalty generally in Furman v. Georgia, in which it struck down
Georgia’s death penalty statute because it could result in arbitrary
44
sentencing, effectively invalidating all death penalty laws then in

36. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447 (“[I]t was for the legislature to say in what
manner sentence of death should be executed . . . [and] this act was passed in the
effort to devise a more humane method of reaching the result . . . .”).
37. Id.
38. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 336 n.92 (referring to Kemmler’s
execution as a “well-publicized technical and medical bungle”); see also Denno,
Legislatures, supra note 24, at 73–74 (“Kemmler’s mishap was a blight on the memory
of state legislatures . . . [yet e]lectrocution quickly became a popular means of
execution in other states, despite comparable reports of mishaps and botches.”).
39. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
40. See id. at 464 (rejecting the argument that forcing Francis to go through the
“psychological strain” of preparing for electrocution a second time would subject
him to a lingering and unnecessarily cruel death); see also King, supra note 33
(discussing Francis’s case as “[p]erhaps the most egregious” capital punishment case
to come before the Supreme Court).
41. Francis, 329 U.S. at 463–64. But see id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the judgment but acknowledging the possibility that a “hypothetical
situation” involving a “series of abortive attempts at electrocution or even a single,
cruelly willful attempt” might lead to a different outcome).
42. See Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death
Penalty in the United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 792–93 (2008) (citing Francis as
an example of the ineffectiveness of early constitutional challenges to methods of
execution).
43. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
44. See id. at 255–57 (“[W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in
imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout,
or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by
social position may be in a more protected position.”).
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45

place nationwide. The Court later upheld Georgia’s revised death
46
penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia, reasoning that the Eighth
Amendment’s meaning is informed by society’s “‘evolving standards
47
of decency’” and that the punishment must not be “excessive.” The
Court described “excessive” as involving “the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” and being “grossly out of proportion to the severity
48
of the crime.” The Gregg decision signaled an end to post-Furman
49
suspension of executions; states began to enact new death penalty
50
statutes to conform to Gregg’s constitutional requirements.
B. Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty’s Proportionality
During the thirty-two years since Gregg, the Supreme Court, in a
series of rulings addressing the death penalty’s proportionality, has
progressively limited the circumstances under which states may
51
administer capital punishment. Considering “the evolving standards
52
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” the Court

45. See ZIMRING, supra note 18, at 69–70 (discussing the effect of the Furman
decision as “implying a new set of federally determined principles that state death
penalty laws would have to satisfy to conform to the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment,” and signaling a departure from the historic autonomy states enjoyed
with respect to capital punishment procedures).
46. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Court considered Georgia’s revised capital
sentencing procedures, which required that the judge or jury find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, at least one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances before
imposing a death sentence. Id. at 196–97.
47. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 81, 99 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
48. Id.
49. See ZIMRING, supra note 18, at 49–50 (discussing the resumption of executions
following Gregg as a “critical event” in the transformation of American’s image with
respect to capital punishment).
50. Id. at 76.
51. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) (discussing the
“tension” in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence between establishing
bright-line rules and considering the circumstances of each individual case, to which
the Court has responded by narrowing the circumstances under which capital
punishment may be imposed).
52. The Supreme Court first articulated this phrase in the 1958 case of Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), in which it opined that the exact meaning of the
Eighth Amendment is “not static.” This was not an entirely new concept as the Court
had earlier stated in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), that the cruel
and unusual punishments clause “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” This
enduring phrase has informed the Court’s modern Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–70 (1989) (“In
determining what standards have ‘evolved,’ . . . we have looked not to our own
conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole . . . .
This approach is dictated both by the language of the Amendment—which
proscribes only those punishments that are both ‘cruel and unusual’—and by the
‘deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal

2009]

CONTEMPLATING “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL”

641

has looked to objective indicators to determine whether a challenged
53
punishment is in line with contemporary values.
54
In Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court considered whether the
death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for the crime of the
55
rape of an adult woman. Applying the principles of its earlier ruling
in Gregg, the Court looked for “objective evidence of the country’s
present judgment concerning the acceptability of rape of an adult
56
woman” by reviewing public opinion, legislative judgments, and the
57
In addition to considering these objective
response of juries.
factors, the Court determined that its own judgment would “be
brought to bear on the question of” whether a punishment is
58
unconstitutional. In light of both the objective evidence and its own
informed judgment, the Court found “a sentence of death [to be]
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
59
rape.”
60
The Court reflected this line of reasoning in Enmund v. Florida,
where it held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the
61
imposition of a death sentence for the crime of felony murder.
Enmund was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in
a robbery in which a murder was committed, even though he
62
“himself did not kill or attempt to kill.” In reaching its conclusion
the Court again deferred to the judgment of a majority of state
legislatures that death was an excessive punishment, this time for the
63
crime of felony murder.
64
65
More recently, in Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, the
Court held the death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment
system.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976))), overruled by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
53. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
54. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
55. Id. at 592.
56. Id. at 593.
57. See id. at 593–97 (asserting that the fact that Georgia is the only jurisdiction
allowing the death penalty for rape when the victim is an adult woman militates in
favor of a finding that such a punishment is disproportionate).
58. Id. at 597.
59. Id. at 592.
60. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
61. Id. at 788.
62. Id. at 798.
63. Id. at 801. But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 146–58 (1987)
(distinguishing Enmund and holding that death may be imposed for the crime of
felony murder where the defendants did not themselves kill the victims, but where
their participation in the events leading up to the murders was active, recklessly
indifferent, and substantial).
64. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
65. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
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for crimes committed by the mentally retarded or juveniles,
66
respectively. Previously, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court refused to
find that two states’ prohibition on executing individuals suffering
67
from mental illness constituted national consensus.
In Atkins,
however, after discussing the change in the legislative landscape since
its earlier ruling, the Court opined that the growing number of states
prohibiting execution of the mentally ill reflects a strong national
68
consensus against authorizing the death penalty for such offenders.
Likewise in Roper, the Court overruled its 1989 decision in Stanford v.
69
Kentucky and found significant evidence of a national consensus
against executing juveniles because thirty states prohibited the death
penalty for juveniles, and in the states without a formal prohibition,
70
the execution of juveniles was rare. Finally, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,
the Supreme Court recently held that death is a disproportionate
punishment for the crime of the rape of a child when the victim does
71
not die.
C. Toward a More Humane Method of Execution:
The Use of Lethal Injection in the United States
The evolution of execution methods in the United States reflects a
72
historical trend toward finding more humane methods of execution.
This trend has culminated in the near universal use of lethal injection

66. 492 U.S. 302, 302 (1989) (finding that evidence showing that only two states
prohibited a sentence of death for a mentally retarded offender was insufficient to
demonstrate a national consensus), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
67. Id.
68. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (noting that thirty states proscribe the death
penalty for the mentally ill, and stating that this number is less significant than “the
consistency of the direction of change”).
69. 492 U.S. at 361 (finding a lack of a national consensus against executing
juveniles because twenty-two of the thirty-seven death penalty states permit it for
sixteen-year-old offenders, and twenty-five permit it for seventeen-year-olds).
70. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (explaining the slower pace of change as
compared to Atkins as the result of the earlier recognition by states of the
impropriety of executing juveniles).
71. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651–58 (2008) (reasoning that only six states permit the
death penalty for the crime of child rape, with no sign this number is growing, and
pointing out that no one has been executed for the rape of a child since 1964).
72. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526–27 (2008) (discussing the use of
hanging in the nineteenth century, followed by electrocution, then lethal gas, and
ultimately lethal injection). But see Denno, Legislatures, supra note 24, at 65
(“[L]egislatures typically change an execution method only to stay one step ahead of
a looming constitutional challenge to that method because the acceptability of the
death penalty process itself therefore becomes jeopardized.”).
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as the preferred method of execution among states administering
73
capital punishment.
Support for lethal injection gained momentum in the wake of
Gregg as legislatures began to reexamine the death penalty and
74
execution procedures.
Lethal injection was attractive to
75
policymakers both for its apparent humaneness and for its relative
76
low cost compared to other methods of execution.
77
Lethal injection was first adopted by Oklahoma in 1977.
“No
committee hearings, research, or expert testimony was presented
prior to final passage of the bill,” and the exact combination and
78
quantities of drugs to be used were not identified. The three-drug
protocol was later developed by Oklahoma’s Chief Medical Examiner,
79
Dr. Jay Chapman.
Chapman had no relevant expertise, did not
consult any other medical professionals, and later expressed concern
80
When applying the
about the protocol’s proper administration.

73. See Death Penalty Information Center, Lethal Injection: Drugs Used in
Various
States,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-moratoriumexecutions-ends-after-supreme-court-decision#drugs (last visited Nov. 15, 2008)
[hereinafter Drugs Used in Various States] (noting that thirty-five of the thirty-six
death penalty states authorize lethal injection executions); see also Dieter, supra note
42, at 798 (“Since the start of 2000, ninety-eight percent of the country’s executions
have been carried out by lethal injection.”).
74. See ZIMRING, supra note 18, at 50–51 (describing how states resuming capital
punishment faced “image problems” associated with antiquated execution
mechanisms and “needed . . . a new method of execution that could appear to be
both humane and efficient, a symbol of scientific progress in the service of modern
capital punishment,” and that lethal injection was viewed as the solution); cf.
Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the
Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 64 (2007) [hereinafter Denno, Quandary]
(discussing how lethal injection was first examined as a possible execution method by
a New York state commission in 1888, but was ultimately passed over in favor of
electrocution, partly out of concern by the medical community that the public would
associate the medical profession with death).
75. See Dieter, supra note 42, at 798 (“With lethal injections, offenders are put to
sleep, and dispatched with as much decorum as putting down a long-valued animal.
Lethal injections were not meant to be spectacles or to horrify the offender . . . . The
state was confident that witnesses would report seeing a peaceful death.”).
76. See Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation of the
Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 770 (2008) (discussing the role of
economics in the decision by Oklahoma legislators to adopt lethal injection, as the
state’s electric chair required $62,000 in repairs and the cost of a new gas chamber
was projected at $300,000, while lethal injection was estimated to cost only $70 to
administer).
77. See Ellen Kreitzberg & David Richter, But Can It Be Fixed? A Look at
Constitutional Challenges to Lethal Injection Executions, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 445, 452–
54 (2007) (discussing the origins of the first lethal injection protocol and statute).
78. Id. at 453.
79. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 65–68 (explaining that Oklahoma
legislators approached Chapman after medical societies refused to offer assistance).
80. See id. at 66–69 (“By all accounts, . . . Chapman was the major, if not the
primary, creator of lethal injection. At the same time, he remains shocked by reports
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three-drug protocol, lethal injection administrators use sodium
81
thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. The
first drug, a fast-acting barbiturate, induces unconsciousness; the
second, a paralytic agent, inhibits all movement, including breathing;
82
the third stops the heart by inducing cardiac arrest.
83
Over time, other states adopted lethal injection. In 1982, Texas
became the first state to carry out an execution by lethal injection
84
when it executed Charles Brooks, Jr., “in a botched procedure.”
Thirty-five of the thirty-six death penalty states now use lethal
85
injection, which is commonly considered the most humane method
86
of execution. While protocols vary across jurisdictions, thirty of the
thirty-five states with lethal injection use the same combination of
87
drugs challenged by the petitioners in Baze.
Lethal injection came under fire following a 2005 study published
88
in a British medical journal, The Lancet. This study discussed the risk
that if the sodium thiopental anesthetic were improperly
administered, the drug could wear off too quickly, leaving the inmate
in excruciating pain during the execution as the effects of the
potassium chloride were felt, but unable to cry out as the
89
pancuronium bromide-induced paralysis set in.
In comparison,

that lethal injection generally is not performed by doctors but rather by individuals
with little to no familiarity with the procedure.”) (citations omitted).
81. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527 (2008).
82. Id.
83. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 78 (describing how, from 1977 to
2002, states began to adopt lethal injection in a “fast-moving cascade of multistate
clusters”); see also Ty Alper, What Do Lawyers Know About Lethal Injection?, 1 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV., Mar. 3, 2008, at 2 (2008), http://www.hlpronline.com/Alper.pdf
(“[T]here is ‘scant evidence that ensuing states’ adoption of lethal injection was
supported by any additional medical or scientific studies that the adopted form of
lethal injection was an acceptable alternative to other methods. Rather, . . . the
various states simply fell in line relying solely on Oklahoma’s protocol . . . .’”
(quoting Baze v. Rees, No. 04-CI-01094, 2005 WL 5797977, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. July 8,
2005), aff’d, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006), aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008))).
84. Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 375; see also Dieter, supra note 42, at 798
(discussing how botched executions were considered “aberrations” and lethal
injection was largely thought to be an “innovative, humane, and symbolic” method of
execution).
85. Drugs Used in Various States, supra note 73 (noting that Nebraska uses the
electric chair). But see State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 279 (Neb. 2008) (holding that
electrocution as a method of execution violates the Nebraska constitution), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 228 (2008).
86. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537.
87. See id. at 1532–33 (discussing the “probative” value of the consensus among
states in favor of the three-drug lethal injection protocol).
88. Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for
Execution, 365 LANCET 1412 (2005).
89. See id. at 1412–14 (finding executioners in Texas and Virginia had no
anesthesia training, and that forty-three percent of the executed inmates tested in
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most states prohibit the use of paralyzing drugs in animal
90
Although the findings reported in the Lancet are
euthanasia.
91
considered controversial, the study generated concerns over the
humaneness of lethal injection and provided fuel to the increase in
92
method-of-execution challenges over the past several years.
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Jurisprudence and the Struggle
for a Uniform Constitutional Test
In a series of procedural rulings that allowed death row inmates to
challenge methods of execution in federal courts through § 1983 civil
93
rights actions, the Supreme Court opened the floodgates to lethal
94
injection litigation over the past several years. The volume of this
litigation has led to confusion as lower courts have applied a variety
of different Eighth Amendment standards for reviewing method-ofthe study had such low concentrations of anesthesia as to be consistent with
awareness).
90. See Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal
Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 844 (2008) (noting forty-two states ban the use
of paralyzing drugs in animal euthanasia, while the rest are silent on the issue); see
also Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 76 (discussing the “shocking inconsistency”
in how procedures for euthanizing animals demand “substantially more medical
consultation and concern for humaneness” than those used to execute humans).
But see Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1535 (“[C]omparison to animal euthanasia . . . overlooks
the States’ legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death.”).
91. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532 n.2 (noting that seven medical researchers
criticized the reliability of the study in peer responses).
92. See Douglas A. Berman, Finding Bickel Gold in a Hill of Beans, 2005–2006 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 311, 315 (“The Lancet article . . . became the focal point for new court
challenges by death row defendants . . . assert[ing] that [it] provided new and
compelling evidence that the standard three-drug lethal injection protocol violated
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.”).
Evidence of numerous botched executions suggests the risks analyzed by the Lancet
study have indeed been realized. See, e.g., Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 56–57
(revealing some of the “disturbing details” exposed during lethal injection
challenges, such as the subjection of a Kentucky prisoner to untrained executioners
who inserted catheters into his neck, the apparent suffocation of an Ohio prisoner
during the course of an almost two-hour execution, admissions by a doctor charged
with monitoring a North Carolina prisoner’s level of consciousness that he had not
done so, and the execution of a “tormented, conscious prisoner” in Florida).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (authorizing suits in federal court against state
and local governments where a plaintiff alleges that someone violated one of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights while acting under color of state law); see also Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (reiterating Nelson v. Campbell in holding that
Clarence Hill had an action to challenge Florida’s lethal injection procedure under §
1983); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (ruling unanimously that a
challenge to the constitutionality of an execution method could be brought as a civil
rights claim under § 1983); Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 77, at 463–67 (detailing
the procedures for challenging lethal injection protocols under § 1983).
94. See Berman, supra note 92, at 317–18 (discussing the “profound nationwide
ripple effect” the Court’s decision in Hill had on lethal injection litigation,
particularly after the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had
ignored Nelson in reviewing Clarence Hill’s claim).
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95

execution challenges. Some courts have applied a “substantial risk”
96
standard, while others have applied a more stringent “unnecessary
97
As one legal commentator has observed, this
risk” standard.
inconsistency is problematic because these “are two very different
98
standards that could lead to disparate results.”
The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court and the differing
legal standards applied by lower federal courts in the face of
increased challenges to execution protocols reflected a growing need
99
On September 25, 2007, the
for a uniform constitutional test.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear an appeal from the
100
decision of the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Baze v. Rees.
Death row inmates Ralph Baze and Thomas Clyde Bowling, Jr.,
both convicted of murder in Kentucky and sentenced to death,
argued before the United States Supreme Court that the appropriate
standard to determine whether an execution method is constitutional
is whether the method poses an “unnecessary risk” of pain and
101
102
suffering.
They argued that flaws in the lethal injection process

95. See Alley v. Little, 447 F.3d 976, 977 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he dysfunctional patchwork of stays and executions going on in this country
further undermines the various states’ effectiveness and ability to properly carry out
death sentences. We are currently operating under a system wherein condemned
inmates are bringing nearly identical challenges to the lethal injection procedure. In
some instances stays are granted, while in others they are not and the defendants are
executed, with no principled distinction to justify such a result.”).
96. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1082 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying a
“substantial foreseeable risk of the wanton infliction of pain” standard to uphold
Missouri’s lethal injection execution protocol); Walker v. Johnson, 448 F. Supp. 2d
719, 722 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing a challenge to Virginia’s lethal injection
protocol, finding that it did not involve an “objective substantial risk of harm”).
97. See, e.g., Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a
challenge to California’s lethal injection method of execution as falling short of
demonstrating an “unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain”); Cooey v. Taft, No.
2:04-cv-1156, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65480, at *15–19 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2007)
(applying an “unnecessary risk” standard and granting a stay of execution); Morales
v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974–82 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding California’s lethal
injection protocol created an “undue and unnecessary risk” of pain and directing the
executive branch to address its numerous “critical deficiencies”).
98. Alison Nathan, Pausing the Machinery of Death: The Supreme Court Takes Baze,
JURIST, Sept. 27, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/09/pausingmachinery-of-death-supreme.php.
99. Id.
100. 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006).
101. See Brief for Petitioners at 30–33, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 075439) (arguing the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently
recognized that a punishment may not involve “the infliction of ‘unnecessary’ pain”)
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459 (1947), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1878)).
102. See id. at 10–24 (identifying historical problems with Kentucky’s three-drug
protocol, process problems with the State’s administration of the protocol—
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create a foreseeable risk of agonizing pain that the State could easily
103
Kentucky
reduce or eliminate by adopting a different procedure.
argued the “substantial risk” test used by the courts below is the
correct standard, and that the “unnecessary risk” standard would
unduly burden states by forcing them to constantly fine-tune their
procedures, no matter how minimal the risks associated with the
104
current protocols were.
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari
led to a nationwide de-facto moratorium on executions, as courts
began staying executions pending the high court’s decision and
further clarification on the appropriate Eighth Amendment
105
standard.
E. The Supreme Court’s Splintered Ruling in Baze
While seven Justices agreed that Kentucky’s lethal injection
protocols are constitutional, the Court was sharply divided as to the
appropriate standard for evaluating the constitutionality of lethal
106
injection.
Six Justices who concurred in the judgment wrote
107
The splintered ruling left some
separate opinions.
108
109
commentators, and even some Justices themselves, predicting that
the decision will ultimately result in renewed efforts to challenge the
way the death penalty is administered.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito,
asserted that an execution procedure may not involve a “substantial

including lack of proper training of execution team members and inadequate
facilities—and evidence of botched executions in other states).
103. See id. at 24–25 n.12 (arguing that administration of a single dose of a
thiopental or other barbiturate would be less prone to error, and noting
veterinarians favor this method for animal euthanasia “because of its simplicity and
humaneness”).
104. Brief for Respondents at 29–35, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439).
105. See Dieter, supra note 42, at 804 (discussing the impact of the Supreme
Court’s grant of certiorari in Baze as marking the first time since Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), that the United States has experienced a six-month period
without a single execution).
106. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting that no clear
standard for determining the constitutionality of a method of execution emerged
from the plurality’s ruling).
107. Id. at 1525–38 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 1538–42 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at
1542–52 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1552–56 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1556–
63 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1563–67 (Breyer, J., concurring).
108. See Adam Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, but Hardly the Challenges, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2008, at A26 (reporting predictions that the Court’s decision in Baze will
cause increased litigation).
109. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring) (predicting that the
plurality’s decision will result in an increase in future lethal injection litigation,
because “we have left the States with nothing resembling a bright-line rule”).
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110

The risk of pain from an improper
risk of serious harm.”
administration of the sodium thiopental, and Kentucky’s failure to
adopt the purportedly safer alternatives, were not sufficient, a
plurality of the Court held, to show that the challenged protocols
111
were “objectively intolerable.” Roberts suggested that a state would
be immune from challenges to its lethal injection protocols as long as
the protocols were “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s, in light of
112
available alternatives.
“[T]he proffered alternatives,” under this
standard, “must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact
113
significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.”
In a separate opinion, Justices Thomas and Scalia argued that an
execution method is constitutional unless it is “deliberately designed
114
to inflict pain.”
Justices Stevens and Breyer both agreed that
Kentucky’s method was constitutional but took issue with Chief
115
Justice Stevens, denouncing capital
Justice Roberts’ rationale.
116
punishment for the first time,
suggested that states should
117
reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide, the
110. Id. at 1529, 1532 (plurality opinion) (noting at the outset that the death
penalty is constitutional, and that “the Constitution does not demand the avoidance
of all risk of pain in carrying out executions”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 1537 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1533–35 (noting
first that Kentucky has implemented numerous safeguards to prevent the improper
administration of thiopental, including a requirement that members of execution-bylethal-injection teams have at least one year of professional experience; second, that
no other state uses the one-drug method advanced by the petitioners, “the
comparative efficacy” of which has not been conclusively established; and third, that
the states have a “legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death”).
112. Id. at 1537 (contesting Justice Stevens’s dissenting characterization of the
plurality’s opinion as creating uncertainty as to future disposition of other Eighth
Amendment cases).
113. Id. at 1532.
114. Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the standard articulated by
the plurality is unsupported by the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment
and the Court’s method-of-execution precedent).
115. See id. at 1552 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (declining to depart
from the Court’s precedent upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, and
finding the petitioners’ evidence insufficient to prove that Kentucky’s protocol
violates the Eighth Amendment); see also id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the standard articulated by the dissent but concluding that on the
record before the Court, Kentucky’s protocol did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment).
116. Id. at 1551–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (acknowledging his
respect for precedent establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty and a
framework for addressing method-of-execution challenges, but expressing his view
that “the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with
only marginal contributions to any discernible or social purposes’” (quoting Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring))); see also Linda
Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens Renounces Capital Punishment, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A22 (discussing the historical significance of Justice Stevens’s
repudiation of the death penalty).
117. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1544 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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paralytic agent that has generated much of the controversy
118
Justices Ginsburg and Souter
surrounding lethal injection.
dissented on the grounds that they were not convinced Kentucky had
taken all the safeguards necessary to prevent an “untoward, readily
119
avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain.” Although
no clear standard emerged from the splintered decision, the
120
“substantial risk” test appears to be the prevailing rule.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S UNWILLINGNESS TO CRITICALLY EXAMINE
METHOD-OF-EXECUTION CHALLENGES IS INCONSISTENT WITH
ITS PROPORTIONALITY JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court’s proportionality precedents discussed in Part
I demonstrate that the Court is willing to hear death penalty cases
and gradually narrow the circumstances under which states may
authorize the death penalty.
The Court’s steady review of
proportionality cases stands in stark contrast to its limited review of
121
method-of-execution challenges.
This inconsistency is significant
because the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the meaning of
122
the Eighth Amendment changes as society evolves. Interpreting the
Eighth Amendment’s meaning in light of contemporary values
should not be limited to questions of whether the penalty of death is
disproportionate to a particular crime; rather, a proper
interpretation demands an additional inquiry into the methods used
123
to carry out such penalty.
118. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
119. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120. See Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 298 n.4 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying the
“substantial risk” standard to a Virginia inmate’s constitutional challenge to
execution by lethal injection, asserting that the plurality opinion authored by the
Chief Justice in Baze “represents the controlling opinion of the Court”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
121. This is not the only inconsistency in the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 321–22 (arguing the Court’s
avoidance of method-of-execution Eighth Amendment challenges is in “striking
contrast” with its frequent consideration of the constitutionality of prison conditions
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
122. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“[A]n assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to
the application of the Eighth Amendment.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910) (“[The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause] is not fastened to
the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice.”).
123. But see Dwight Aarons, The Abolitionist’s Dilemma: Establishing the Standards for
the Evolving Standards of Decency, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 441, 460 (2008) (discussing the
presumption among courts and commentators that the “evolving standards of
decency” proportionality standard should be applied to assess method-of-execution
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In Gregg, the Court asserted that “an assessment of contemporary
values . . . requires . . . that we look to objective indicia that reflect the
124
Thus, in evaluating
public attitude toward a given sanction.”
challenges to the death penalty’s proportionality, the Court has
carefully analyzed objective factors to determine whether a national
consensus exists favoring the restriction of the death penalty for
125
certain offenses or offenders.
In Baze, however, the Court’s
examination of objective measures of national consensus was
126
127
Further, the
comparatively cursory and ultimately unpersuasive.
inconsistency in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is
more troubling when considered in light of the Cruel and Unusual
128
Punishments Clause’s original purpose in proscribing torture.
While a possible explanation for this incongruity may be the Court’s
reluctance to grapple with complex medical and scientific issues that
are perhaps better resolved legislatively, a survey of the Court’s
Eighth Amendment cases reveals that it has been willing to address
129
such issues under other circumstances.
A. The Supreme Court’s Claimed National Consensus Favoring
Lethal Injection Is Illusory
The Court’s argument in Baze, that a national consensus favors the
use of lethal injection, is unconvincing. Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the plurality, suggested that Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection
protocol reflected a “broad consensus” favoring this method of
execution, in light of the fact that it is used by a vast majority of states
administering capital punishment, as well as the Federal
Government, and is “believed to be the most humane [method-of-

challenges, but arguing that the two are not completely analogous: looking to
contemporary norms is more appropriate when the “touchstone” of the inquiry is
moral culpability, unlike method-of-execution challenges in which the “inquiry is
more practical and focused on physical pain”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Gregg, 428 U.S at 173.
125. See, e.g., Aarons, supra note 123, at 444–45 (discussing the six factors
measuring “substantive proportionality” the Court has traditionally applied in
examining whether a death penalty practice is within the evolving standards of
decency: (1) history, (2) judicial precedent, (3) statutes, (4) jury sentencing, (5)
penological goals, and (6) international and comparative law).
126. See infra Part II.A (detailing the Baze decision’s shallow analysis).
127. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the lack of synchrony between the Baze decision
and other Supreme Court precedent).
128. See supra Part I.A (describing the historical impetus behind the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause); infra Part II.C.
129. See infra Part II.D (revealing the Court’s inconsistency by providing examples
of its willingness to adjudicate highly technical and medical cases in other
circumstances).
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130

execution] available.” By citing legislative statistics as evidence of a
national consensus, the Court tacitly drew from the approach it used
when it evaluated the death penalty’s proportionality in view of
“evolving standards of decency” in Coker, Edmunds, Roper, Atkins, and
131
In each of these cases, the Court looked to the
later, Kennedy.
number of states authorizing or proscribing the death penalty for the
132
specific offense or offender at issue to reach its conclusion.
Absent from the Baze opinion was a critical analysis of any other
factors indicating that the three-drug lethal injection protocol
133
comported with society’s current “standards of decency.” Yet, in its
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence interpreting the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court has looked beyond
trends reflected in state legislation to other factors reflecting
134
135
contemporary values, such as public opinion, sentencing juries,
136
and the laws and practices of other countries.
130. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532–37 (2008) (plurality opinion) (noting
“at the outset that it is difficult to regard a practice as ‘objectively intolerable’ when it
is in fact widely tolerated,” and pointing out all thirty-six states that authorize the
death penalty use lethal injection, and of these, thirty use some combination of
sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride).
131. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“[T]he ‘clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by
the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989),
overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304)).
132. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2653 (2008) (“[O]nly six . . .
jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for rape of a child.”); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“[Thirty] States prohibit the juvenile death penalty . . . .”);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (discussing how the execution of the mentally impaired is
banned in thirty states); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789 (1982) (stating that
eight jurisdictions had authorized the death penalty for participation in a robbery
during which an accomplice committed murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
595–96 (1977) (“Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present
time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman.”).
133. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at
311–12, for the proposition that the age of the Court’s only three method-ofexecution cases—Wilkerson, Kemmler, and Resweber—diminishes their utility because
the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency”).
134. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (“[A]ttention must be given to the public attitudes
concerning a particular sentence—history and precedent . . . are to be consulted.”).
135. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794 (finding American juries’ unwillingness to
sentence felony murderers to death reflected a broader societal consensus that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits death for such crimes). However, although a jury can
be a reliable indicator of contemporary values, jury sentences are not applicable in
the method-of-execution context because they have no role in determining how
states carry out executions. See, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 644 (2004)
(explaining that an Eighth Amendment challenge to a method of execution brought
by a prisoner convicted by a jury and sentenced to death does not directly call into
question the validity of the sentence itself).
136. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (asserting that its conclusion that the juvenile
death penalty is excessive is validated by the “stark reality” that no other country in
the world allows it); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting the overwhelming
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In Atkins, for example, the Court cited additional factors that it
argued “reflect[ed] a much broader social and professional
consensus” as support for its conclusion that executing mentally
137
The Court considered
retarded offenders was unconstitutional.
opposition from several social and professional organizations,
including the American Psychological Association, the shared views of
“widely diverse religious communities in the United States,” and
polling data revealing a broadly held belief among Americans—
including supporters of the death penalty—that execution of
138
mentally retarded criminals was wrong.
In response to the Court’s grant of certiorari in Baze, several
medical, religious, and ethical organizations expressed grave
concerns about the current administration of lethal injection in the
139
United States. One legal commentator has argued that the medical
community’s refusal to participate in executions—particularly those
140
by lethal injection—”bear[s] on the standards of decency factor.”
Although the plurality in Baze acknowledged the current controversy
surrounding lethal injection, it concluded that it would be
inappropriate for the Court to involve itself in a “best practices”

disapproval by the world community of the execution of mentally impaired
individuals); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (“It is thus worth noting that the doctrine
of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in
Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in
continental Europe.”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (“[T]he climate of international
opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular punishment . . . is . . . not
irrelevant.”). But see Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
foreign law has no place in the Court’s reasoning and asserting that the majority’s
reliance on it is inconsistent and serves only to “‘affirm’ . . . the Justices’ own notion
of how the world ought to be”).
137. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Critical Care Providers and Clinical Ethicists in
Support of Petitioners at 11, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5439)
(arguing against the use of pancuronium bromide in the “end-of-life context” for
medical and ethical reasons, since it masks any outward signs of stress or pain); Brief
of the American Ass’n of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (“AAJLJ”) as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 7, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (asserting that the
“substantial risk” standard is unacceptable under Jewish Law, which requires the
administration of the method of execution involving the least amount of pain and
suffering); Brief for the Fordham University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for
Law and Ethics as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13, 34, Baze, 128 S. Ct.
1520 (No. 07-5439) (arguing that the current lethal injection protocol was not the
product of reasoned consideration, and discussing aspects of the adoption of lethal
injection which have led to continued suppression of public scrutiny of the
procedure and its administration).
140. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 385 (stating the American Medical
Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs’ position that physicians are not
allowed to participate in executions).
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debate, deferring instead to state legislatures to decide the manner in
141
which they administer the death penalty.
While the Court has looked to statistical evidence of a reduced
incidence of capital punishment for certain crimes in contemplating
the death penalty’s excessiveness, it was unwilling to consider
evidence of a high incidence of botched executions in reviewing a
142
method-of-execution challenge in Baze.
For example in Kennedy,
the Court looked to execution statistics from other states authorizing
capital punishment for child rape and found that in each no one had
been executed for the crime of raping a child since 1964, reinforcing
the Court’s determination that imposing the death penalty for the
143
The Baze
crime of child rape contradicts contemporary values.
plurality, however, did not acknowledge the statistical evidence of
numerous botched executions that have taken place over the past
144
several decades in other states administering lethal injection, even
though the petitioners argued that Kentucky’s protocols exposed
them to the risk of pain in the event of an improper administration
145
of the lethal drugs. The Court only indirectly addressed the risk of
146
a botched execution, drawing on Resweber to assert that an “isolated
mishap alone does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment
147
violation.”
Further, while Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion regarding lethal
injection’s near universal use in death penalty states is of course
factually correct, it is difficult to maintain that modern lethal
injection procedures comport with contemporary standards of
decency when there is very little the public actually knows about
148
Although recent botched executions, like that of Joseph
them.
141. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text.
143. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2657–58 (2008); see Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 564–65 (2005) (pointing out that only six states have executed juveniles
since the decision in Stanford); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (stating that in states
with no express prohibition on capital punishment for mentally impaired offenders,
only five such executions have taken place since 1989).
144. See RADELET, supra note 3.
145. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530–31.
146. 329 U.S. 459, 463–64 (1947) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that “because
he once underwent the psychological strain of preparation for electrocution,
[requiring] him to undergo this preparation again subjects him to a lingering or
cruel and unusual punishment”). See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court’s refusal in Resweber to find an Eight Amendment violation
given the instant facts).
147. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (citing Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463–64, in response to the
petitioners’ claim that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol exposes prisoners to the
risk of “severe pain” if the drugs are not properly administered).
148. See Alper, supra note 83, at 1–2 (discussing lethal injection’s “sordid” and
“skimpy” history and the fact that, because people presumed lethal injection was safe
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Lewis Clark, have attracted media attention and shed more light on
the procedures states use to administer capital punishment, there is
still a significant lack of transparency attending the lethal injection
149
process.
Some commentators attribute the secrecy surrounding lethal
injection first to a concern by states that public awareness of their
execution protocols will expose them to increased capital
150
punishment litigation, and, second, to “blissful ignorance” on the
part of the public to the practical realities of specific execution
151
mechanisms.
Regardless, this lack of information complicates
152
efforts to review the constitutionality of lethal injection protocols.
Thus, even if the Court had attempted to gauge public opinion, by,
for example, considering polling data similar to that it relied upon in
Atkins, such an analysis would be of questionable probative value
153
given that the public is largely ill-informed. Moreover, it is perhaps
easier for the public to understand and make a judgment as to which
criminals deserve to be executed than about the medically complex
procedures used to carry out those executions.

and humane, little attention was paid to its adoption and “the automatic
transparency that typically attends legislative action was absent”). But see Baze, 128 S.
Ct. at 1527 n.1 (acknowledging the three-drug lethal injection protocol was adopted
by states “without significant independent review,” but arguing that the move to this
method of execution was “motivated by a desire to find a more humane alternative to
then-existing methods”).
149. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 95–96 (detailing the limited public
availability of states’ specific lethal injection protocols); see also Douglas A. Berman &
Alison J. Nathan, Debate, Baze-D and Confused: What’s the Deal with Lethal Injection?,
Debate,
156
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 312,
316–17
(2008),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/lethalinjection.pdf (discussing the three
reasons for the limited public awareness of lethal injection procedures: (1) the
paralytic agent masks any outward, physical signs of suffering, causing the media
witnessing executions to convey a “sanitized version” to the public, (2) specific lethal
injection protocols are developed by prison officials and often exempted from
administrative review, and (3) states “tenaciously guard[] the information as secret
and nonpublic”).
150. See Berman & Nathan, supra note 149, at 322 (“State officials believe, quite
justifiably, that any information-sharing good deed will be punished through new
rounds of litigation brought by death row defendants and death penalty
opponents.”).
151. See id. at 323.
152. See id. at 328 (arguing that the national consensus analysis is frustrated in the
method-of-execution context because of the lack of transparency and public
knowledge due to states’ refusal to release information about lethal injection
protocols and procedures, and asserting that it is up to the Supreme Court to “probe
the[se] troubling realities”).
153. See supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (detailing the lack of
information that is available to the public regarding lethal injection procedures).
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B. Legislation Is Unreliable as an Objective Indicator
of Lethal Injection’s Acceptability
The plurality’s reliance on state legislation as the sole indicator
154
that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol is “objectively []tolerable”
raises several concerns. While legislation is generally considered the
155
strongest indicator of a national consensus, it is less persuasive in
the context of method-of-execution challenges than in cases assessing
proportionality. This is because most states with lethal injection
enacted generalized legislation to implement it, meanwhile
delegating development of the specific execution protocols to
156
untrained prison personnel. As Justice Stevens acknowledged in his
concurring opinion in Baze, “[i]n the majority of States that use the
three-drug protocol, the drugs were selected by unelected
Department of Correction officials with no specialized medical
knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or
157
guidance.”
Thus, while decisions of democratically-elected bodies
concerning punishments are considered presumptively valid in the
158
face of a constitutional challenge, Stevens argued that the “drug
selections [adopted by states using lethal injection] are not entitled
159
to the kind of deference afforded legislative decisions.”

154. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
155. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“[The] clearest and most
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country’s legislatures.”) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989),
overruled by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304).
156. See Denno, Legislatures, supra note 24, at 116–23 (explaining the vagueness of
most lethal injection statutes, the majority of which fail to list the quantity of the
various chemicals used or specify information on the quality or training of execution
officials).
157. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(pointing out that only a third of the states with lethal injection expressly authorize
the use of a chemical paralytic agent, such as pancuronium bromide, arguing that
the failure of states or Congress to prohibit its use should not be considered “a
nationwide endorsement of an unnecessarily dangerous practice,” and asserting that
pancuronium bromide’s specific authorization by some state legislatures was more
the product of a “stereotyped reaction” than “a careful analysis of relevant
considerations favoring or disfavoring” its adoption) (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 520–21 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
158. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175–76 (1976) (“[I]n assessing a
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional
measure, we presume its validity. . . . And a heavy burden rests on those who would
attack the judgment of the representatives of the people. . . . The deference we owe
to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system is enhanced where
the specification of punishments is concerned, for ‘these are peculiarly questions of
legislative policy.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,
393 (1958))).
159. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Moreover, state legislation, when used as an indicator of national
consensus, should be considered within the broader context of the
information and time for in-depth inquiry available to states at the
160
time of its passage. The suggestion of a national consensus favoring
Kentucky’s three-drug protocol as the preferred method of execution
is difficult to substantiate when viewed in light of the haphazard way
lethal injection was developed—without medical or scientific
161
study —and the budget concern justifications for its adoption in
162
The questionable reliability of legislation alone as a
many states.
reflection of societal values concerning lethal injection weakens the
Baze plurality’s conclusion that Kentucky’s execution protocol is
163
“widely tolerated” nationally.
C. The Court’s Limited Review of Method-of-Execution Challenges Is
Contrary to the Original Understanding of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause
The inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s limited review of
method-of-execution challenges as compared to its more critical
proportionality jurisprudence is also at odds with the Eighth
Amendment’s original purpose. The drafters of the Constitution
“were primarily concerned . . . with proscribing ‘tortures’ and other
164
‘barbarous’ methods of punishment.”
Indeed, the Framers
intended that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would be
165
adopted to “prohibit[] certain methods of punishment” and was not
expanded to encompass disproportionate punishments until the 1910
166
case of Weems v. United States. As Justice White argued in his dissent
in Weems, “it may not be doubted, and indeed is not questioned by

160. See Aarons, supra note 123, at 449 (arguing that legislation is not always a
sound indicator of public values because “[l]egislators often face stark policy choices
and frequently compromise to resolve their differences”).
161. See Denno, Quandary, supra note 74, at 70 (describing the development of
lethal injection by two Oklahoma legislators and the state’s Chief Medical
Examiner).
162. See Denno, Executions, supra note 24, at 374 (discussing economics as a “major
impetus” behind the adoption of lethal injection because it was significantly less
expensive than electrocution and lethal gas).
163. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532–33 (plurality opinion).
164. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976) (attributing this fact to
statements made by Patrick Henry at Virginia’s constitutional convention, as well as
similar concerns raised at the Massachusetts convention) (citation omitted).
165. Granucci, supra note 26, at 842 (emphasis added).
166. 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see id. at 383 (White, J., dissenting) (holding that a
sentence of twelve years hard labor was disproportionate to the crime of falsifying
official public records and therefore “repugnant to the Bill of Rights”); Granucci,
supra note 26, at 842–43 (explaining the history of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause).
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anyone, that the cruel punishments against which the Bill of Rights
provided were the atrocious, sanguinary, and inhuman punishments
167
which had been inflicted in the past upon the persons of criminals.”
This interpretation of the Eighth Amendment was also echoed by
Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Baze, when he argued
that the Framers’ intention in adopting the Eighth Amendment—to
prevent “torturous modes of punishment”—has “permeated” the
168
Court’s method-of-execution jurisprudence.
A consideration of the Eighth Amendment’s original
understanding suggests that avoiding painful executions is more
aligned with preventing torture, the purpose of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, than with limiting the death penalty’s
169
reach. It would thus seem that evidence pointing to the possibility
of an excruciatingly painful death would attract as much, if not more,
exacting scrutiny by our nation’s highest Court—in an effort to be
faithful to the purpose and intent of the Eighth Amendment—than
the more general analysis of the types of crimes and criminals eligible
for death.
Indeed, original intent has been an important component of the
Supreme Court’s analysis in other areas of its jurisprudence,
170
In District of Columbia v.
particularly the Second Amendment.
171
Heller, a case decided just a few months after Baze, the Supreme
Court struck down a District of Columbia gun control law, holding
that it violated the Second Amendment’s protection of an
172
The Court relied heavily on the
individual’s right to bear arms.
Second Amendment’s original understanding to reach its conclusion,
including analyzing the meaning of the phrases “keep arms” and
“bear arms” at use during the period that the Amendment was
167. Weems, 217 U.S. at 390 (White, J., dissenting).
168. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556, 1556–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (discussing the Framers’ debates and early commentary on the
Constitution as evidence that the Eighth Amendment was originally understood as
prohibiting “torturous punishments,” and arguing that the plurality’s “substantial
risk” standard was inconsistent with this original understanding).
169. See supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text (discussing the Framers’
concern with prohibiting types of punishment and distinguishing it from the Court’s
current concern with who can be exposed to the death penalty).
170. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
171. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
172. Id. at 2822–23. Heller was significant in that it marked the first time in history
that the Supreme Court invalidated a gun control law on the grounds that it violated
the Second Amendment.
See Cameron Desmond, Comment, From Cities to
Schoolyards: The Implications of an Individual Right To Bear Arms on the Constitutionality
of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2008).
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adopted, the Amendment’s legislative history, and commentary by
173
legal scholars immediately following the Amendment’s ratification.
Thus, the Baze plurality’s failure to give weight to the Eighth
Amendment’s original purpose stands in contrast to the Court’s
critical analysis of original intent in interpreting other controversial
constitutional questions.
D. Medical and Scientific Considerations Do Not Offer
a Compelling Justification for the Court’s Reluctance To Critically Analyze
Execution Methods
One possible explanation for the Court’s reluctance to critically
address method-of-execution challenges, in contrast to its
proportionality jurisprudence, is a sense by the Court that a more
exacting review of execution protocols would involve complex
medical and scientific judgments, which are perhaps better left to
states to resolve legislatively. Indeed, the Baze plurality argued as
much when it rejected the petitioners’ submission that evidence of a
“slightly or marginally safer alternative” method would be enough to
prove Kentucky’s three-drug protocol violated the Eighth
174
Amendment.
This reasoning is inconsistent with the Court’s willingness to make
medical and scientific judgments in earlier cases in which it reviewed
Eighth Amendment challenges to the death penalty’s
175
proportionality.
In Atkins, for example, the Court examined
various clinical measures of mental retardation, including medical
definitions, psychological assessments, and the results of intelligence
176
tests to assess the defendant’s criminal culpability.
Similarly, the
Court in Roper drew on social science research findings that juveniles
are more predisposed to reckless behavior than adults and less able to
appreciate the negative consequences of their actions as support for
its conclusion that juveniles should not be subjected to death, which
177
it argued should only be reserved for the “worst offenders.” Thus,
the Court has demonstrated the ability in other areas of its Eighth
173. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792–805.
174. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008) (plurality opinion) (arguing
that it would be ill-advised for the Court to become “embroil[ed] . . . in ongoing
scientific controversies beyond their expertise”); see also id. at 1562 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[C]omparative-risk standards . . . require courts to resolve medical and
scientific controversies that are largely beyond the judicial ken.”).
175. See infra notes 176–178 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s use of
scientific evidence in the determination to disallow the use of the death penalty for
the mentally retarded and juveniles).
176. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308–09 nn.3–5 (2002).
177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
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Amendment jurisprudence to engage in scientific debates exceeding
its expertise, particularly in cases where such evidence supported its
178
The Baze plurality, however, acknowledged the
conclusion.
179
controversy surrounding the Lancet study, but declined to “take
180
sides in this dispute.”
This inconsistency is troubling in light of the fact that a thorough
consideration of the constitutionality of methods of execution must
181
be informed by medical and scientific judgments.
By avoiding a
more critical examination of the available medical and scientific
evidence, the Court has made it less clear how lower courts should
analyze what specifically amounts to a “risk of severe pain” or what
182
protocols would be considered “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAZE DECISION
The constitutional standard for reviewing method-of-execution
challenges that the Court articulated in Baze was borrowed from an
183
earlier ruling in Farmer v. Brennan, a case involving an Eighth
Amendment challenge to prison conditions. The petitioner in Farmer
was a transsexual prisoner projecting female characteristics who was
beaten and raped after being transferred to an all-male state
184
The
penitentiary known for its violence and history of assaults.
petitioner argued that federal prison officials were aware of the
petitioner’s vulnerability under these circumstances and acted with
“deliberate indifference” to the petitioner’s safety in violation of the

178. See, e.g., id. at 569–71 (noting that sociological studies detailing juveniles’
“lack of maturity and . . . underdeveloped sense of responsibility” supported the
Court’s conclusion that juveniles should not face the death penalty); Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 318–19 (relying on clinical definitions to determine that mentally retarded
defendants have a reduced culpability and consequently should not be subjected to
the death penalty); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 835 n.42 (1988)
(utilizing a professional report, which discussed the psychological conditions of
juveniles on death row, to support the contention that juveniles are less culpable).
179. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (discussing the Lancet study as
an illustration of the problems with the use of the three-drug lethal injection
protocol).
180. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1532 n.2 (2008) (plurality opinion).
181. See id. at 1570 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Considering that the
constitutionality of Kentucky’s protocol depends on guarding against the . . . risk [of
consciousness during otherwise painful procedures], the plurality’s reluctance to
consider medical practice is puzzling. No one is advocating the wholesale
incorporation of medical standards into the Eighth Amendment . . . . That medical
professionals consider such [additional safeguards] important enough to make it the
standard of care in medical practice, I remain persuaded, is highly instructive.”).
182. See Liptak, supra note 108 (discussing the uncertainty created by the Court’s
“fractured decision” in Baze and the likelihood of increased capital litigation).
183. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
184. Id. at 831.
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185

Eighth Amendment. The Court held that a prison official violates
the Eighth Amendment “for denying humane conditions of
confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable
186
measures to abate it.”
Arguably, a “substantial risk” of inmate assault—while indeed
grave—is different from that of an excruciatingly painful execution.
The main concern with this standard, however, is that it is subjective.
It is not clear exactly what the Baze plurality meant by “substantial
risk” and “serious harm” in the context of administering capital
187
punishment. This is problematic because, preferably, courts should
rely on objective factors as much as possible in considering an Eighth
188
Amendment challenge.
The Court’s decision to use the challenge by the Kentucky
petitioners in Baze to clarify the constitutional standard for methodof-execution challenges also has implications for future judicial
review of state execution protocols. The record in Kentucky was not
developed—there had been only one execution by lethal injection at
189
the time Baze was decided —making Baze an arguably poor test case
for considering the constitutionality of lethal injection as it is
190
The Court’s splintered ruling not only
currently administered.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 847.
187. See Liptak, supra note 108 (noting worries that “[t]he court is giving different
messages” in regards to Eight Amendment jurisprudence).
188. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment
judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible
extent.”).
189. Kentucky carried out its second execution by lethal injection on November 21,
2008, when it executed convicted child-killer Marco Allen Chapman. Jason Riley,
Chapman Executed for ’02 Slayings, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Kentucky), Nov.
22, 2008, at 1A.
190. See Dieter, supra note 42, at 803–04 (“[T]he suit brought by the petitioners
had not been subjected to the thorough federal hearings conducted in similar cases
that were under way in California and Missouri. The hearings in Kentucky were
instead held in state court, and considered only Kentucky’s procedures, not the vast
array of problems that had arisen in other states.”); see also Shah, supra note 6, at
1141 (arguing that it is paradoxical that Kentucky, a state with minimal experience
administering lethal injection and which proscribes physician involvement in
executions, “is to serve as the model for states with far more experience in this area
and prior physician involvement”). Moreover, because the plurality suggested that
states whose execution protocols were “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s would
survive constitutional review, see Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537–38 (2008) (“A
State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold
today would not create a risk that meets this standard.”), states defending against
challenges to their execution methods could simply alter their protocols to avoid
judicial scrutiny. Such a response could potentially impede a more critical analysis of
whether a state’s protocol involves a “substantial risk of serious harm.”
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makes increased lethal injection litigation more likely, it also
creates uncertainty as to how the Court might resolve a hypothetical
future challenge to another state’s protocol in which there is more
documented evidence on execution procedures, including possible
192
evidence of botched procedures. The sparse documented evidence
available in Baze and the lack of a clear, objective constitutional
standard is legally problematic because it means that states preparing
for or responding to method-of-execution challenges are left with
limited insight into how courts might resolve the issue going
193
forward.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Baze, despite its historical
significance, did not conclusively resolve the confusion surrounding
constitutional challenges to methods of execution. Thus, states going
forward with lethal injection should develop objective criteria to
ensure their protocols do not pose a “substantial risk” of unnecessary
pain in light of feasible alternatives.
States should evaluate medical evidence on the risk of pain
194
involved, documentation on botched executions, and medical and
scientific testimony on the feasibility and safety of alternative
methods to determine whether their protocols pass constitutional
muster. Further, recognizing the limitations of individual federal
judges’ ability to review complicated medical data on a case-by-case

191. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text (noting concern that the
Court’s ruling will lead to increased litigation).
192. See Joan Biskupic, Ky. Ruling Leaves Room for Future Tests of Issue, USA TODAY,
Apr. 17, 2008, at 7A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
judicial/2008-04-16Lethalinside_N.htm (discussing how the chances of success for
lethal injection challengers may increase long-term with more developed evidence of
botched executions and other problems with lethal injection).
193. Challenges to the constitutionality of lethal injection procedures are already
under way in several other states, and this trend will likely continue. See Emmett v.
Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 302, 308 (2008) (applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Baze to reject a challenge to Virginia’s three-drug lethal injection protocol, arguing
that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Virginia’s protocol posed a “substantial
or objectively intolerable risk of severe pain” and did not show that the alternative
one-drug protocol was “feasible or readily implemented”); see also Adam Liptak &
Adam B. Ellick, Judge Orders Ohio To Alter Its Method of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2008, at A16 (discussing an Ohio judge’s order that the state’s execution protocols
be changed, conceding that current procedure would fail under Baze); Sean
O’Sullivan, Judge Continues Death Penalty Stay for Delaware, NEWS J., May 15, 2008, at 1B
(explaining a decision by a federal judge in Delaware to suspend executions pending
a hearing on the similarities between the Delaware and Kentucky procedures).
194. See Kreitzberg & Richter, supra note 77, at 478 (suggesting that states should
consider the “period of time it takes for unconsciousness to occur” to better
understand the risk of pain accompanying lethal injection).

662

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:633

195

basis, states charged with ensuring the constitutionality of their
protocols should conduct legislative hearings or appoint task forces
to develop specific guidelines for their execution protocols, relying
on the objective factors discussed above. States should not defer to
prison personnel to develop and carry out procedures that implicate
196
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts,
important constitutional questions.
concluding his plurality opinion in Baze, hinted that the outcome of
this case signals an opportunity for states to engage in a thoughtful
debate over and examination of execution protocols to ensure that
197
lethal injection is carried out as humanely as possible.
In addition, courts reviewing the constitutionality of execution
procedures and lawyers litigating such challenges should insist on
transparency and demand that state lethal injection protocols are
198
made available to the public. As one federal judge pointed out in a
recent law review article, “[i]n examining the evolving standards of
decency, we cannot expect the public’s standards to evolve if the
public is unaware of what procedures are actually performed upon
199
This could be achieved by states releasing the
the condemned.”
findings of legislative committees or task forces and, ultimately,
enacting more specific legislation giving explicit directives to prison
officials on how executions are to be carried out.
CONCLUSION
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a gradual
willingness to limit the classes of crimes and criminals eligible for
195. See, e.g., Berman supra note 92, at 327 (arguing that federal courts are illequipped to “sort[] through alternative execution technologies, debatable medical
evidence, and the administrative issues that states face in carrying out scheduled
executions” and are more effective in serving as “watch-dog[s]” to prevent against the
use of questionable execution methods).
196. See supra notes 156–159 and accompanying text (noting how most specific
lethal injection procedures are not determined by elected officials).
197. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1538 (2008) (plurality opinion) (“The broad
framework of the Eighth Amendment has accommodated this progress toward more
humane methods of execution, and our approval of a particular method in the past
has not precluded legislatures from taking the steps they deem appropriate, in light
of new developments, to ensure humane capital punishment. There is no reason to
suppose that today’s decision will be any different.”).
198. Attorneys for Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling have initiated another
challenge in Kentucky state court, this time arguing the State’s lethal injection
protocol should be made public. See Dave Spencer, Two Death Row Cases Back in
Kentucky Supreme Court, Oct. 16, 2008, WTYK.COM, http://www.wkyt.com/home/
headlines/31129604.html.
199. See Gaitan, supra note 76, at 786–87 (discussing recommendations for
improved transparency and oversight of lethal injection, including detailed and
public written protocols, which he argues would “significantly ease the burdens on
the courts and litigants” in future lethal injection litigation).
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capital punishment. The Court has prohibited the death penalty for
juveniles and the mentally retarded and held capital punishment
unconstitutional for the crime of rape, felony murder where the
200
defendant did not kill or intend to kill, and child rape. This trend
in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is inconsistent with
its historical reluctance to critically examine the specific procedures
states use to carry out the death penalty.
The Court’s less rigorous review of method-of-execution challenges
was demonstrated by its splintered ruling upholding Kentucky’s
201
lethal injection mechanism in Baze.
The Baze plurality did not
thoroughly analyze relevant evidence of whether lethal injection, as it
is carried out today, is objectively tolerable to our society. Yet the
Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent mandates that determinations
of what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” be consistent
202
While the Court based its
with our contemporary values.
conclusion in part on the fact that the vast majority of States with
capital punishment use the three-drug protocol at issue in Baze, this
analysis is less persuasive in this context, given the manner in which
states adopted lethal injection and the public’s limited understanding
of the issue. In addition, this incongruity raises further constitutional
questions in light of the Eighth Amendment’s original purpose of
preventing tortuous punishments. Finally, while the Court in Baze
seemed to justify its conclusion by arguing that the judicial branch is
ill-suited to make determinations on complex medical and scientific
judgments, this reasoning is inconsistent with the Court’s willingness
to engage in the debate over controversial medical and scientific
issues in making determinations as to the death penalty’s
excessiveness.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Baze in some ways seemed to raise
as many constitutional questions as it answered. In light of the lack of
a clear standard set forth by the Supreme Court, states facing
renewed constitutional challenges to their execution methods in the
wake of Baze would do well to take a hard look at their execution
protocols and, drawing on objective evidence to the fullest extent
possible, consider ways in which they might be strengthened.
200. See supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
cases that began determining which defendants and which crimes warranted the
death penalty).
201. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1571–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (commenting on the
Court’s acceptance of Kentucky’s protocol despite the procedure’s failure to include
many safety measures).
202. See supra notes 130–132 (noting the Court’s reliance on public opinion in
justifying the allowance of certain lethal injection methods).

